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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
BAILEY SERVICE & SUPPLY Cor-
poration, a Corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
its ROAD COMMISSION, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Pursuant to stipulation of the parties and the plead-
ings on file, the sole question presented to the lower 
Court was whether the construction of a viaduct by the 
State Road Commission that prevented entry to Bailey 
Service and Supply's warehouse by large capacity ve-
hicles which had historically delivered most of the prop-
erty stored therein was a destruction of or material in-
terference with the right of access appurtenant to the 
warehouse property so as to amount to a "taking" of 
Bailey's property by the Commission. 
Case No. 
13857 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On cross motions for summary judgment, the lower 
Court by Memorandum Decision determined and held 
that the construction odE the viaduct by the Commission 
that prevented entry to Bailey Service and Supply's 
warehouse by such large capacity vehicles was a destruc-
tion of the right of access appurtenant to the warehouse 
property and, therefore, amounted to a "taking" of 
Bailey's property by the Commission. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent Bailey Service and Supply seeks affirm-
ance of the judgment of the lower Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Since 1964 the property involved in this action has 
been designed and used as a warehouse. (Paragraph 3, 
Complaint, R. 85, admitted in paragraph 1 of Section 
II, Answer, R. 68; Paragraph 2, Affidavit of William F. 
Bailey, R. 45.) Its highest and best use is that of a ware-
house. (Paragraph 5, Affidavit of Raymond S. Fletcher, 
R. 42.) For any structure to be useable as a warehouse, 
access to it must exist for large-capacity motor vehicles. 
(Paragraphs 5-7, Affidavit of Jesse A. Watson, R. 38-39). 
Since 1964, the weight and size of the property stored 
in the warehouse (such as highway truck tires and off-
the-highway (heavy equipment tires)) has required that 
such property be transported into and out of the building 
by means of sizeable trucks. (Paragraph 7, Complaint, 
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R. 85, admitted in Paragraph 1 of Section II, Answer, 
R. 68; Paragraph 4, Affidavit of William F. Bailey, R. 
45.) Approximately 70% of the goods destined for stor-
age in the warehouse arrive in Salt Lake City aboard 
40-foot trailers hauled by common or contract motor car-
riers. Due to shipping economy and convenience, ordi-
narily each of such trailers contains nothing but goods 
consigned to the warehouse. (Paragraph 5, Affidavit of 
William F. Bailey, R. 45-46.) A large doorway opening 
on Fourth South had historically furnished such trucks 
with access to the warehouse. Until 1970, Fourth South 
Street in front of the warehouse had been sufficiently 
wide (approximately 80 feet, 40 feet to the center line) 
to enable those large trucks to maneuver through said 
doorway. (Paragraph 8, Complaint, R. 86, admitted in 
Paragraph 1 of Section II, Answer, R. 68; Paragraphs 3 
(R. 45) and 6 (R. 46), Affidavit of William F. Bailey; 
Paragraph 4, Affidavit of Raymond S. Fletcher, (R. 42).) 
During 1970, the Utah State Road Commission be-
gan construction of a viaduct running longitudinally 
along the center of Fourth South. The width of the 
viaduct is less than that of Fourth South, leaving a strip 
of the original road along its southern boundary. That 
strip fronts pkintiffs' warehouse and is wide enough (22 
feet 8 inches) to accommodate one lane of east-bound 
traffic. The strip is not, however, sufficiently wide to 
enable trucks of the necessary size to maneuver through 
the large doorway which in the past furnished access to 
plaintiff's warehouse. (Paragraphs 9-11, Complaint, R. 
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86, admitted in Paragraph 1 of Section II, Answer, R. 
68; Paragraphs 7-10, Affidavit of William F. Bailey, R. 
46-47.) Prior to the construction of the Fourth South 
viaduct), the warehouse had a fair market value of $42,-
500.00. (Paragraph 6, Affidavit of Raymond S. Fletcher, 
R. 43.) As a consequence of the interference with access 
occasioned by the viaduct, the value of the warehouse 
property was decreased in the amount of $8,700.00. (Par-
agraph 14, Complaint, R. 87, admitted, Paragraph 2, Sec-
tion II, Answer, R. 68; Paragraph 3, Stipulation, R. 71; 
Paragraph 6, Affidavit of Raymond S. Fletcher, R. 43.) 
The parties to this litigation executed a Stipulation 
which recited in paragraph 2 that the parties had dis-
cussed plaintiff's rights and remedies with respect to 
the interference of access alleged in the Complaint. (R. 
70-72). Paragraph 2 further recited that as a result of 
those discussions, the differences of the parties related 
only to the issue of whether the interference and dam-
age referred to in the Complaint amounted to a "taking" 
of plaintiff's property by defendant. Paragraph 3 of the 
Stipulation recited that this was the only issue which 
need be and which may be decided in an action to be 
filed by Bailey Service and Supply. The parties, further, 
agreed that if plaintiff prevailed on that issue, defendant 
would pay plaintiff $8,700.00 (Paragraph 3) and that 
defendant waived the defenses of sovereign immunity, 
notice (Paragraph 4) and any right it may have had to 
a cost bond. (Paragraph 5.) 
The Honorable Judge of the lower Court, per Mem-
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orandum Decision (R. 11-12) and after viewing the prem-
ises, as indicated therein (R. 12), determined and held 
that the State's defense of sovereign immunity would 
not apply if a taking of Respondent's property by the 
Commission had occurred. The Court then determined 
and held that the above facts amounted to a destruction 
of the right of access appurtenant to Bailey Service and 
Supply's property for the only vehicles that must have 
access thereto for the property to be used as a warehouse, 
as it historically had been, and a taking had, therefore, 
occurred. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DEFENSE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUN-
ITY IS NOT AVAILABLE TO THE STATE 
ROAD COMMISSION AS THIS ACTION IS 
SUBSTANTIVELY NOT A SUIT FOR MON-
EY DAMAGES AGAINST THIS STATE 
AGENCY BUT, ON THE CONTRARY, A 
CONSENT BY THE COMMISSION TO A DE-
TERMINATION BY THE LOWER COURT 
OF W H E T H E R THE ABOVE FACTS 
AMOUNTED TO A TAKING AND AN 
AGREEMENT BY THE COMMISSION TO 
COMPENSATE BAILEY SERVICE AND 
SUPPLY IN THE AMOUNT STIPULATED 
IF THE LOWER COURT FOUND AGAINST 
THE STATE ON THIS ISSUE MADE FOR 
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THE PURPOSE OF EXPEDITING RESOLU-
TION OF THE CONTROVERSY AND TO 
PREVENT BAILEY FROM FILING A SUIT 
SEEKING TO ENJOIN THE INDIVIDUAL 
MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION FROM 
CONSTRUCTING THE VIADUCT. 
Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution pro-
vides that: "Private property shall not be taken or dam-
aged for public use without just compensation." The 
statutory eminent domain law of this State is based 
upon the premise that when an arm of government seeks 
to acquire private property or rights therein it will in-
itiate condemnation proceedings. Chapter 34, Title 78 
U. C. A. (1953) Eminent Domain. However, prior to 
the execution of the Stipulation on file herein (discussed 
infra), the facts of the instant action presented the situ-
ation of a taking or damaging of Bailey Service and Sup-
ply's property by the State for which the State had 
neither instituted condemnation proceedings nor agreed 
to pay compensation. 
The most exhaustive prior decision of this Court on 
the rights and remedies of an aggrieved private party for 
the failure of the State to condemn or pay compensation 
for a taking or damaging by it is State by State Road 
Commission v. District Court, Fourth Judicial District 
94 Utah 384, 78 P. 2d 502 (1938). In this case the in-
jured parties sued the State Road Commission and the 
contractor, seeking to enjoin the construction of a viaduct 
which they alleged would interfere with their convenient 
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access to the property and deprive them of their ease-
ment of light and air. The State sought a writ of prohibi-
tion from this Court alleging the action was barred by 
sovereign immunity. The Attorney General argued that 
no "taking" had occurred as the state had not sought 
"to enter upon, take, or appropriate any part of the plain-
tiff's lands", and, therefore, "the abutting owners, if 
damaged," could "present a claim for compensation to 
the State oBard of Examiners" under the statutory prede-
cessor of Section 63-6-11, U. C. A. (1953). 94 Utah at 
392. 
This Court, citing Stockdale v. Rio Grande Western 
Railway Co., 28 Utah 201, 77 P. 849, 852, and Dooley 
Block v. Salt Lake Rapid Transit Company, 9 Utah 31, 
33 P. 229, 231, 24 A. L. R. 610, to the effect that ". . . 
any substantial interference with private property . . . 
by which the owner's right to its use and enjoyment is 
in any substantial degree abridged or destroyed, is, in 
fact and law a taking, in the constitutional sense, to the 
extent of the damages suffered, even though the title 
and possession of the owner remained undisturbed . . . ," 
(94 Utah at 384) thought that under this standard the 
allegations of the Complaint in the lower Court amounted 
to a "taking". 94 Utah at 400. This Court went on to 
conclude that the doctrine of Sovereign Immunity ap-
plied to suits against the state or the State Road Com-
mission by a private party for a taking or damaging as 
an alternative remedy for enforcement of Article I, Sec-
tion 22 was available to the injured private party: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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We think if a case arises where there is no 
other method of enforcing a constitutional right 
except by suit against the State, then it must 
be considered that the State has given its con-
sent to be used in such a case. In this case, 
however, we hold that the Road Commission-
ers individually may be enjoined from pro-
ceeding in a manner forbidden by the Constitu-
tion—that it is therefore unnecessary to permit 
suit against the State itself or its agency. 94 
Utah at 399. 
This Court indicated this remedy of injunction against 
the individual Commission members was available re-
gardless of whether a taking or damaging occurred, since 
the remedy for damaging of presenting a claim to the 
Board of Examiners failed to satisfy due process. 94 
Utah 400. It was, thus, unnecessary for the Court to de-
cide whether a taking or a damaging occurred under the 
facts then before the Court, as the remedy of injunction 
against the individual Commissioners was deemed avail-
able for either. This Court summarized its conclusions 
as follows: 
If the construction involved in this case con-
stitutes either a taking or a damaging of the 
property of the owner of abutting land, then 
the Road Commissioner's should either (1) 
agree with the landowner upon the question 
of damages or (2) condemn . . . , or (3) upon 
suit for injunction being brought, they (or the 
State Road Commission as such) should con-
sent to a determination by the Court.. .of the 
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question whether the property will be dam-
aged, and, if so, the amount which will consti-
tute "just compensation" for the taking or 
damaging, and should consent to judgment for 
damages if any are found. If the Road Com-
missioners refuse to pay the damage claimed 
by the landowner, and refuse to institute or 
submit to proceedings for determination of the 
question whether any damages will result and 
if so the amount thereof, then it seems clear 
that they are acting in violation of the consti-
tutional guaranty and they should be enjoined 
from proceeding with the construction, (em-
phasis added) 94 Utah at 401-402. 
Justice Wolfe dissented. He was of the view that 
since the proposed construction of the viaduct required 
that only a more circuitous route be followed to reach 
the abutting property, no taking had occurred but the 
private parties had suffered only consequential damage. 
94 Utah at 431. He differed from the majority opinion 
only in that he was of the opinion that the remedy for 
"damage" under the Constitutional provision quoted 
above of applying for compensation to the Board of Ex-
aminers satisfied due process and, therefore, an injunc-
tive action against the individual commissioners should 
lie for a taking only and not for damaging: 
The remedy to prevent a "taking" without 
agreed compensation or condemnation would 
be by injunction because such a taking would 
be without authority. The remedy for damages 
caused by an agency of the state performing 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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! 
its functions would be enforced as it is enforced 
in all other cases against the state where rem-
edy is not specifically given by statute, to wit, 
by resort to the Board of Examiners. 94 Utah 
2d at 408. 
Justice Wolfe went on to distinguish between taking and 
damaging. In the course of that discussion, he stated: 
On the side of the line where acts done in pur-
suance of an authorized objective are not auth-
orized, are all those cases which involve an 
actual taking of property. The State Road, 
Commissioners do not act within their author-
ization when they attempt to build a road over 
my property without acquiring it or arrang-
ing for compensation. But, ordinarily, when 
they do not physically take any property, but 
only improve or build on the State's own high-
way, which is one of the purposes of their 
existence, they act within their authority, and 
any consequential damage which may inci-
dentally occur does not divest them of author-
ity. It is true that they may in some cases so 
raise a grade or build a viaduct or do some 
other act on the State's highway which, while 
not actually intruding on the property of an-
other may cause such a serious interference 
with the enjoyment of that abutting property 
as to amount to a "taking", (emphasis added) 
94 Utah at 433-434. 
Later case law of this Court has accepted Justice 
Wolfe's analysis in his; dissent in the Fourth Judicial 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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District Court case on the points in which it differed 
from the majority opinion. In Hampton v. State Road 
Commission, 21 Utah 2d 342, 455 P. 2d 708 (1968), pri-
vate parties, inter alia, sought to enjoin the individual 
members of the Commission from further construction 
of Interstate 15, alleging that a fence and guard rail 
erected through the street which fronted their property, 
and into which their driveway ran, substantially inter-
fered with their right of access and amounted to a tak-
ing of their property without condemnation or agreed 
compensation. This court observed: 
This distinction between a "taking" and con-
sequential damage was first developed in Utah 
by Justice Wolfe in his dissenting opinion in 
State by State Road Commission v. District 
Court, Fourth Judicial District (94 Utah 384, 
78 P . 2d 02 (1973)). He stated that the rem-
edy to prevent a "taking" without agreed com-
pensation or condemnation would be by injunc-
tion because such taking would be without 
authority. On the other hand, an injunction 
will not be allowed where the State Road Com-
mission neither physically takes any property 
nor while not actually intruding does not cause 
such a serious interference with the enjoyment 
of the abutting property as to amount to a 
"taking", since any consequential damage 
which may incidentally occur or be caused by 
the State Road Commissioners' acts does not 
divest them of their authority, (emphasis add-
ed) 21 Utah 2d at 344-345. 
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In Springville Banking Co. v. Burton, 10 Utah 2d 
100, 349 P. 2d 157 (1960), the Commission placed a con-
crete divider in the highway, thereby requiring south-
bound traffic to follow a more circuitous route to reach 
plaintiffs business. This Court held an extraordinary 
writ of mandamus to compel the state to pay damages 
unavailable to plaintiff as sovereign immunity was a bar 
to suit and plaintiff could not do indirectly what it could 
not do directly. This Court also held that the injury 
suffered in requiring a more circuitous route to be 
traveled to reach abutting property was consequential 
damage. 
In Anderson Investment Corporation v. State, 28 
Utah 2d 379, 503 P. 2d 144 (1972), Anderson sought to 
enjoin the individual members of the commission from 
proceeding with construction of a viaduct, alleging the 
viaduct so interfered with its easement of light, air, view 
and access as to amount to a "taking". 28 Utah 2d at 
381. However, as in the Fourth Judicial District Court 
and Springville Banking cases, the only damage suffered 
as a result of the highway impediment was the need for 
Anderson's customers to take a more circuitous route 
to enter Anderson's property. Anderson relied on the 
majority opinion in the Fourth Judicial District Court 
case claiming the injunction action would lie whether 
or not a taking or damaging occurred. In Anderson, this 
Court accepted the analysis of Justice Wolfe's dissent, 
Le. that an interference with access by the State re-
sulting only in the necessity to follow a more circuitous 
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route was consequential damage, not a taking, and that 
the remedy of injunction against the individual Com-
missioners would not lie for a claim of consequential 
damage. 
The reason these circuity of route cases result only 
in consequential damage, and not a taking (as the ma-
jority in the Fourth Judicial District Court case thought 
but did not hold) is best explained in Hampton, supra: 
The [right of access] does not include the right 
to travel in any particular direction from one's 
property or upon any particular part of the 
public highway right-of-way because, after 
one is upon the highway he has the same right 
as all other travelers and the right of travel 
is a public right and controlled by the police 
power of the State. . . . [W]hat the police 
power may give an abutting property owner in 
the way of traffic on the highway, it may take 
away, and by any such diversion of traffic the 
State and any of its agencies are not liable. 
21 Utah 2d 346-347 (quoting from State 
Highway Commission v. Meier, 388 S.W.2d 
855 (Mo. 1965). 
The present state of Utah law, therefore, given the 
situation of the construction by the Commission of a 
viaduct, divider, guardrail or other impediment in the 
highway, which takes or damages private property or a 
right therein for which the state does not condemn or 
pay agreed compensation, is as follows: 
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(1) If no other way exists to provide the pro-
tection of Article I, Section 22, the section will be held 
self-executing; 
(2) Sovereign immunity is a bar to direct suit 
against the State or its agencies for a taking or damag-
ing; however, if a taking occurs, an injunction action will 
lie against the individual Commissioners pending condem-
nation or agreed compensation and if a damaging occurs, 
recourse is available to the Board of Examiners. 
(3) A taking occurs and the injunctive remedy is 
available if the State in erecting such an impediment 
actually intrudes on private property or, while not ac-
tually intruding, causes such a serious interference with 
with the abutting property as to amonunt to a taking; 
(4) If the impediment results only in a more cir-
cuitous route being required to be traveled to reach the 
abutting property, the injury is consequential damage, 
not a taking, as once upon the highway, travel is a public 
right regulated by the police power and the state incurs 
no liability for altering the flow or direction of traffic; 
and 
(5) If actual intrusion upon the abutting property 
or such serious interference amounting to a taking occurs 
thereto from the impediment and the individual Com-
mission members are sought to be enjoined from con-
struction pending condemnation or agreed compensation, 
the Commission should consent to a determination by 
the Court of the question of whether a taking has oc-
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curred and, if so, should consent to a judgment for 
reasonable compensation if any be found. 
The problem now becomes to apply the above to the 
instant situation as it existed during the construction of 
the viaduct and thereafter. 
Admittedly the taking found by the lower Court does 
not involve the physical appropriation by the State of 
tangible real property owned by Bailey Service and Sup-
ply. Per subparagraph 3 above, however, under well es-
tablished law a "taking" is present not only when private 
property is actually intruded upon, but also when a prop-
erty right recognized by the law — such as an easement 
of access — is destroyed or materially interfered with. 
The case law of this Court as well as that of other 
jurisdictions has uncontrovertably established that an 
owner of property abutting on a street is vested with a 
private easement in that street for access to his property. 
The principle is enunciated as follows in 2 Nichols, Emi-
nent Domain Section 6.32 (3d ed. rev. 1970): 
Even though an owner of land abutting on a 
street does not own the fee of the street he is 
in possession of easements of light and air over 
such street as well as easements of view and 
access. All of such easements constitute prop-
erty for the taking of which he is entitled to 
compensation. (Footnotes omitted). 
Elaboration on the foregoing statement is found in 3 
Nichols, Eminent Domain Section 10.221(2) at 369-70 
(3d ed. rev. 1965): 
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[ I ] is now held very generally throughout the 
United States that, however a street may have 
been originally laid out, if the public has taken 
the fee, there have attached automatically to 
the abutting lands easements of access, light 
and air from the street, which are taken in the 
constitutional sense by the use of the street in 
a manner not constituting a proper exercise 
of the highway easement and interfering with 
such access, light and air. I t has been said that 
an owner of property abutting upon a public 
street has a property right in the nature of an 
easement in the street which is appurtenant to 
his abutting property and which is his private 
right, as distinguished from his right as a mem-
ber of the public. (Footnotes omitted) (Em-
phasis in original). 
See also Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 144 
P. 2d 818, 823 (1943); Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123 
P. 2d 505, 514 (1942). Numerous decisions of this Court 
have established the same principle. The principle was 
originally laid down by ithis Court in Dooly Block v. Salt 
Lake Rapid Transit Co., 9 Utah 31, 33 P. 229 (1893): 
Nor does it matter, in this case, that the fee 
is in the city in trust for the use of the public, 
instead of in the abutting owner in trust for 
street uses: Equally in both cases the abutting 
owners are entitled to the use of the street as 
a means of access to their lots, and for light and 
air. If the fee is in the city, the rights of the 
abutter are in the nature of equitable ease-
ments in fee; if in the abutter, they are is their 
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Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Stipulation on file herein, 
the proper interpretation of which, it is submitted, will 
be depositive of this appeal, provide as follows: 
2. In the past the parties have discussed the 
rights and remedies of Plaintiff which obtain, 
or which may obtain, with respect to the inter-
ference with access which is alleged in the Com-
plaint. As a result of such discussions, the par-
ties have agreed that their differences relate 
only to the following issue: whether the inter-
ference and damage referred to in the Com-
plaint constitutes a "taking"of Plaintiff's 
property by Defendant. 
3. So as to expedite resolution of the contro-
versy between Plaintiff and Defendant, the 
only issue which need be and which may be de-
cided in the action to be filed by Plaintiff is 
that set forth in Paragraph 2 above. In the 
event Plaintiff prevails on said issue, the com-
pensation to be paid to it by Defendant shall 
be the sum of Eight Thousand Seven Hun-
dred Dollars ($8,700.00), together with in-
terest thereon at eight percent (8%) per an-
num from December 1, 1970. (R. 71). 
From the above-quoted paragraphs, it is obvious that 
the facts of this case are that in 1970 and 71, during the 
construction period of the viaduct, Bailey Service and 
Supply was of the opinion that the viaduct, when com-
pleted, would unreasonably interfere with or destroy its 
right of access by preventing entry to the warehouse by 
large capacity trucks which had theretofore delivered the 
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property historically stored in the warehouse. It, there-
fore, contemplated filing an action against the individual 
road Commissioners seeking to enjoin them from further 
construction pending condemnation or agreed compen-
sation, and communicated this intention to the Attorney 
General's office. Though the record does not so indicate, 
at this time the Assistant Attorney General was provided 
with a copy of a memorandum of law prepared by the 
law firm reperesenting Respondent wherein it was con-
cluded that the course of action seeking such injunctive 
relief should be followed. The sitate, by the above-quoted 
paragraphs of the Stipulation, agreed that Bailey had 
suffered $8,700.00 in damage but thought the interference 
with access described in the Statement of Facts above 
insufficient to constitute a "taking" but amounted to 
only "consequential damage". The State, therefore, by 
entering into the Stipulation on file in this action, con-
sented to submit the sole issue of whether a taking ex-
isted to the lower Court and agreed to compensate Bailey 
in the stipulated amount if the taking issue were resolved 
adversely to it. The State, therefore, followed the pro-
cedure suggested by the prior case law of this Court 
outlined in subparagraph 5 above with only two modifi-
cations: it consented to a judicial determination of the 
issue of "taking" before any action had been filed for 
injunctive relief and it agreed to pay a stipulated amount 
as compensation if the issue of taking were resolved 
against it. The State preferred to have the controversy 
so resolved so as to expedite its resolution and, most im-
portantly, to obviate the risk of interference with the 
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construction of the viaduct, no matter how short in 
duration,, if an injunction were sought and granted. The 
Commission, clearly, by prior case law suggestion of this 
Court, is authorized to agree to pay stipulated compen-
sation on such terms. 
The Honorable Judge of the lower Court in his Mem-
orandum Decision held that the defense of sovereign 
immunity would not apply, since he had concluded that 
the acts referred to in the Complain constituted a "tak-
ing". He so found for the facts and reasons enumerated 
above. Further, the Assistant Attorney General in the 
State's brief (page 13) also recognizes that the Hampton 
case, supra, "dearly established that the principle of 
Sovereign Immunity must yield in the case of a complete 
or nearly complete denial of access" and admits that he 
regards this rule as "salutary". The Assistant Attorney 
General, therefore^ concedes that if the issue of whether 
a "taking" exists were resolved against the Commission, 
the Commission acted within its authority in agreeing to 
pay compensation in the stipulated amount for the taking 
to expedite the resolution of this controversy and in lieu 
of Bailey Service and Supply bringing an injunctive ac-
tion against the individual Commissioners. 
As to the arguments of the Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral in the State's brief, he first contends that, assuming 
a taking occurred, this is a direct action against a State 
agency for money damages therefor and is barred by 
sovereign immunity. This argument is based on three 
assumptions: 
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(1) That the State has not consented to such a 
suit for inverse condemnation by the Utah Governmen-
tal Immunity Act, Sections 63-30-1 through 63-30-4, U. 
C. A. (1953); 
(2) That paragraph 4 of the Stipulation entered 
into by the parties on file in this action wherein the 
Assistant Attorney General waived the defense of sover-
eign immunity was beyond his authority as such waiver 
may only be accomplished by the people speaking through 
the legislature; and 
(3) That during the construction of the viaduct, 
Bailey Service and Supply failed to file an injunctive 
action against the individual Commissioners pending con-
demnation or agreed compensation and, having let this 
remedy pass, now seeks to sue the State Road Commis-
sion directly. 
Respondent concedes the first assumption. Admit-
tedly, no statute in Utah, including the Utah Govern-
mental Immunity Act, gives an owner whose property 
is to be, is being or has been, taken the right to bring 
an "inverse condemnation" suit, i.e. to directly sue the 
sovereign appropriate? for compensation for the taking. 
See Holt v. Utah State Road Commission, supra, 30 Utah 
2d 4 at 6, which specifically holds the State has not 
waived immunity for inverse condemnation by the Gov-
ernmental Immunity Act. 
Respondent, however, respectfully submits that the 
first assumption has nothing to do with this litigation. 
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I, Section 22 should in this situation only be deemed self-
executing. 
The Assistant Attorney General in the State's brief 
next seeks to avoid the entire question of whether the 
Commissioners or the Commission as such could consent 
to judicial resolution of the taking issue and agree to 
compensate respondent in a stipulated amount if the 
issue were determined adversely to the State prior to, 
in lieu of, and to prevent Bailey Service and Supply from 
filing an injunctive action against the individual Com-
missioners by arguing that the injury to Respondent as 
a result of the construction of the viaduct is not a taking 
but only consequential damage and, therefore, any test-
ing of this issue by injunctive action would, of necessity, 
have failed as such relief is barred by sovereign immunity 
if only consequential damage is suffered, citing Spring-
ville Banking, supra; Anderson Investment, supra; Fair-
dough v. Salt Lake County, 10 Utah 2d 417, 354 P. 2d 
105 (1960); Hjorth v. Whittnburg, 121 Utah 324, 241 P. 
907 (1952); Holt v. State Road Commission, 511 P. 2d 
1286, 30 Utah 2d 4 (1973); State Road Commission v. 
Utah Sugar Company, 22 Utah 2d 77, 448 P. 2d 901 
(1968). 
This argument, obviously, assumes the very issue 
presented by this litigation, i.e. whether a taking or dam-
aging occurred, to have already been decided in favor of 
the State. It goes without saying that if Respondent 
suffered only consequential damage, sovereign immunity 
would have barred injunctive relief against the individual 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
26 l 
Commissioners. The lower Court, however, held a "tak-
ing" occurred and on page 13 of its brief, the State con-
cedes if that is the case, the doctrine of sovereign immun-
ity does not bar this action. 
The Assistant Attorney General could however, be 
taken to be contending, as the Attorney General unsuc-
cessfully argued in both the Fourth Judicial District 
Court and the Hampton cases, supra, that if the State, 
pursuant to its police power, erects a viaduct, median 
divider, or other impediment solely within the parallel 
confines of the highway, no taking can ever occur as an 
actual infringement on private property is required there-
for. 
This is, of course, not the state of the case law of 
this Court and the injustice of any such rule is too ob-
vious to require refutation. Per the holdings of and quo-
tations from Fourth Judicial District Court, supra; Hamp-
ton, supra; Dooley Block, supra; and Morris, supra, the 
destruction or substantial impairment of an appurtenant 
easement of access is a taking. The above cases cited by 
the Assistant Attorney General in no way militate against 
this long-established case law rule. In Springuille Bank-
ing, supra; and Anderson, supra; this Court held only 
that the requirement that a more circuitous route be 
followed as a result of the cx)nstruction of a viaduct, island 
or other impediment does not sufficiently impair access 
to amount to a taking for the reason given in Hampton, 
supra; that once upon the highway, the right of travel 
is a public one and the flow of traffic may be diverted 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
27 
without liability to the State. This Court, in the course 
of the Springville Banking opinion so recognized: 
Access has not been denied. Interfered with, it 
is true, but not to an unreasonable extent. 
Southbound travelers seeking plaintiff's prop-
erty have to travel but a quarter-mile further 
to reach it. 10 U. 2d at 103. 
In Fairclough, supra, the State exercised its police 
power to lower the grade of a highway below plaintiff's 
abutting land. Plaintiffs sued for deprivation of conven-
ient access but plaintiffs did not have an existing drive-
way or other means of access which could be deprived. 
This Court followed Springville Banking and held such 
consequential interference to be barred by the doctrine 
of Sovereign Immunity. As the Hampton case specific-
ally points out: 
an easement of access contemplates a travelled 
way from the property to the highway, (quot-
ing Utah Road Commission v. Hansen, 14 
Utah 2d 305, 309 (1963). 21 Utah 2d at 346. 
In Hjorth v. Whittenburg, this Court only held that 
while plaintiffs would have been able to bring an in-
junctive action pending condemnation or agreed compen-
sation against the individual Commissioners for the rais-
ing of a highway grade cutting off access to plaintiff's 
abutting property, an action for damages against these 
individual Commissioners was barred by the doctrine of 
Sovereign Immunity. 
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In Utah Sugar, supra, that defendant had to take a 
more circuitous route to inspect its reservoir was held 
not compensable as severance damage in a condemnation 
case, citing inter alia, Hampton. 
In Holt, supra, either another circuitous route or 
lack of established access case was presented to this 
Court and it was held the doctrine of Sovereign Immun-
ity was applicable. The Court specifically recognized, 
however, "there was no taking of property involved in 
this action," 30 Utah 2d at 5. 
This Court has uniformly indicated that if a high-
way impediment not actually infringing upon private 
property constructed by the State in the exercise of its 
police power substantially interferes with the right of 
access, a taking has occurred. As the Hampton decision 
points out: 
Every citizen holds his property subject to the 
valid exercise of the police power. A party may 
recover only when his private property rights 
are taken, but not for rights he enjoys as a 
member of the public. The right of an abutting 
owner to and from the street is a private right, 
in the sense that it is something different from 
the right which the members of the public have 
to use the street for public purposes. Con-
formably to this doctrine, and in part based 
upon it, a person owning . . . premises abutting 
on the public highway or street, whose right of 
access to the same is unreasonably . . . obstruct-
ed, may recover. . . . 21 Utah 2d at 347. 
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Further, this Court indicated in Utah State Road Com-
mission v. Miya, Utah 2d , 526 P. 2d 926 (1974): 
The rights of access, light, and air are ease-
ments appurtenant to the land of an abutting 
owner on a street; they constitute property 
rights forming part of the owner's estate. These 
substantial property rights, although subject 
to reasonable regulation, may not be taken 
away or impaired without just compensation. 
The erection of a permanent structure within 
a public highway of such a character as to rank 
as a proper highway use, even if it diminishes 
the value of abutting property, is not in and 
of itself a damage in the constitutional sense. 
Unless the structure violates some right ap-
purtenant to the abutting property or other-
wise inflicts some special and peculiar injury 
the owner is not entitled to compensation. One 
of the rights appurtenant to abutting property 
is that of receiving light and air from the high-
way, and an abutting owner is entitled to com-
pensation for infringement of his right to light 
and air by a structure in the highway, even if 
it is a proper highway use. Id. at 928-929. 
For the above reasons, Respondent Bailey Service 
and Supply Co. respectfully submits that the resolution 
of the issue of whether the above-refearenced facts amount 
to a taking will be dispositive of the State's belated as-
sertion of the sovereign immunity defense. If a taking 
occurred, and, as pointed out under Point II below, it has, 
sovereign immunity is inapplicable. 
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POINT II. 
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY CON-
CLUDED THAT THE DENIAL OF ACCESS 
TO BAILEY SERVICE AND SUPPLY'S 
WAREHOUSE BY LARGE CAPACITY VE-
HICLES WHICH DELIVERED MOST OF 
THE PROPERTY DESTINED FOR STOR-
AGE THEREIN AS A RESULT OF THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE VIADUCT SO 
SUBSTANTIALLY INTERFERED WITH OR 
DENIED THE PROPERTY RIGHT OR 
EASEMENT OF ACCESS APPURTENANT 
THERETO AS TO AMOUNT TO A TAKING 
OF BAILEY'S PROPERTY BY THE STATE. 
Per the Statement of Facts above, Bailey Service 
and Supply's abutting property had been used as a ware-
house since 1964. This was its highest and best use. For 
any structure to be used as a warehouse, access to it 
must exist for large capacity vehicles as such are in stan-
dard use by common and contract motor carriers and, 
due to shipping economy and convenience, such vehicles 
ordinarily contain nothing but goods consigned to a single 
warehouse. Approximately 70% of the goods destined 
for storage in Bailey Service and Supply's warehouse 
historically had arrived at the warehouse aboard such 
large capacity vehicles not only because such form of 
transportation is customary but also because the weight 
and size of the property stored in the warehouse (such 
as highway truck tires and off ^ he-highway (heavy equip-
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meant tires)) required that such property be transported 
by large capacity vehicles. The viaduct totally destroyed 
access to the warehouse by these large capacity vehicles. 
Thus, the viaduct eliminated one of the attributes which 
must have existed for the subject property to be em-
ployed for its highest and best use. As a consequence, 
the value of the warehouse property declined by $8,700.00. 
By the Stipulation on file herein, the only issue for 
decision in this case is whether the interference with 
access occasioned by the viaduct fronting Bailey Service 
and Supply's property constitutes a "taking" of its prop-
erty by the Commission. The parties agreed that, in 
the event such interference is held to be a taking, the 
compensation to be paid to Plaintiff by Defendant shall 
be the sum of $8,700.00, together with interest thereon 
at eight percent (8%) per annum from December 1, 1970. 
The parties disagree only with respect to the legal con-
clusion to be drawn from such facts, i.e., whether or not 
under such facts the interference with access involved 
constitutes a "taking" of Plaintiff's property or some-
thing less. The lower Court after viewing the premises, 
held and determined these facts amounted to a taking. 
Well established law makes clear that the lower Court's 
decision was correct. 
Per discussion under Issue I, supra, numerous de-
cisions of this Court as well as those of other jurisdictions 
have established that an owner of property abutting on 
a street is vested with a private easement in that street 
for access to his property. Further, as established under 
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Issue I above, substantial interference with this right-of-
aocess, even though not caused by a physical intrusion 
onto such property, amounts to or constitutes a "taking". 
Therefore, the property involved in this action had ap-
purtenant to it an easement of access to Fourth South. 
The real question of this action is the amount of inter-
ference with Respondent's access which is permissable 
before a "taking" is found to be present. Otherwise stated, 
the issue is whether this Court will substitute its judg-
ment for that of the lower Court, arrived at after viewing 
the premises, and hold the denial of access to the only 
vehicles that must have access for the property to be 
used as a warehouse (its highest and best use) did not 
so interfere with the right of access as to constitute a 
taking. 
It is well settled that the extent of the easement 
for access is tested and determined by the nature of the 
abutting property to which such easement is appurtenant. 
The general rule is set forth in 3 Nichols, Eminent Do-
main §10.221 [2] at 370 (3d ed. rev. 1965): 
The extent of the easement of access may be 
said to be that which is reasonably required, 
giving consideration to all the purposes to 
which the property is adapted. (Footnotes 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
See Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 144 P. 2d 
818, 824 (19453); Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123 P. 
2d 505, 514 (1942). 
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The facts of this case are that the highest and best 
use of the realty involved in this action is that of a ware-
house. For a building to be susceptible to long-term use 
as a warehouse, access to it must exist for large-capacity 
motor vehicles. This is true of the property involved 
here as well as in general. Until construction of the 
Fourth South viaduct, access for large vehicles existed 
and was used in connection with Plaintiff's warehouse 
(Bailey Affidavit). Thus, the facts present here estab-
lish: (a) that Plaintiffs property is best suited for use 
as a warehouse; and (b) that as such, the easement for 
access reasonably required by the property is that nec-
essary to provide ingress and egress for large vehicles. 
As a result of the barrier which is created by the 
viaduct, only a 22-foot-8-strip of road remains in front 
of the warehouse. Due to its narrowness, that strip does 
not provide large vehicles with access to Plaintiff's prop-
erty. The Fourth South viaduct has therefore elimin-
ated the access which is reasonably required in light of 
the nature of Plaintiff's abutting tract and, under the 
authorities discussed supra, a property right owned by 
Plaintiff has been taken. 
Admittedly the taking present here does not involve 
the physical appropriation by the State of tangible prop-
erty owned by Plaintiff. As indicated under Issue I above, 
however, under well established law a "taking" is present 
not only when tangible property is appropriated, but also 
when a property right recognized by the law — such as an 
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easement of access — is interfered with in a material way 
or eliminated. 
Although in the present case the State 1ms not physi-
cally intruded onto Plaintiff's tract, as is discussed herein 
it has seriously interfered with Plaintiff's enjoyment of 
the warehouse property, and in a manner which makes 
such interference tantamount to a "taking." The inter-
ference involved here has a direct effect upon Plaintiff's 
property, as distinguished from the business conduced 
thereon. The property is improved with a structure the 
highest and best use of which is a warehouse. To be 
usable as such the structure must, understandably, be 
accessible to vehicles capable of economically transport-
ing commodities to and from the building. With elimina-
tion of the needed access comes substantial impairment 
in the structure's utility as a warehouse. Here, the prop-
erty itself — the land as improved — has been directly 
affected, for the physical as well as the economic ability 
to utilize such property for its intended and most pro-
ductive use has been substantially impaired. 
Reference to the Affidavit of William F. Bailey (R. 
44-49) and Exhibit "A" attached thereto (R. 50) reveals 
the severity of the interference occasioned by the Fourth 
Souht viaduct. The warehouse structure occupies virtu-
ally all of the lot on which it is situated and it is appar^ 
ent that any vehicular traffic must enter directly from 
Fourth South or not at all. Construction of the viaduct 
resulted in the creation of a solid wall opposite all points 
on the warehouse facing the street. The portion of Fourth 
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South which remains useable with respect to the ware-
house is only 22 feet 8 inches wide. Prior to the viaduct, 
the large vehicles upon which warehouse utility is heavily 
dependant had ample room within which to maneuver 
into the building. The amount of room now remaining 
is insufficient to allow such access. As a result, Plain-
tiffs warehouse property is no longer susceptible to long-
term use as such (Watson Affidavit, R. 37-40) and the 
value of such property has declined by $8,700.00 (Fletcher 
Affidavit, R. 41-43). Even the State has admitted that 
a decline in value of $8,700.00 has occurred (R. 71). When 
compared to the warehouse property's pre-viaduct value 
— $42,500 — it becomes apparent that the property has 
diminished in value by slightly in excess of twenty per-
cent. It could not be more dear that the viaduct has 
materially, seriously, and directly affected the warehouse 
property. Under the law of this State, a substantial in-
terference with the ability to make use of one's property, 
even thouh not caused by a physical initrusion onto such 
property, is deemed a "taking." 
The easement for access reasonably required by Re-
spondent's warehouse property has been materially 
abridged. That easement is a private right peculiar to 
Respondent. Moreover, no other lot abutting on Fourth 
South has characteristics which necessitate the type of 
access required by Respondent's warehouse, and the 
access to no other lot has been impaired by the viaduct's 
presence in the way access to the warehouse has been 
affected (Bailey Affidavit). As a result of the viaduct's 
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interference, access to the warehouse for vehicles of the 
necessary size was destroyed and Respondent's property 
declined in value by $8,700.00. Clearly, therefore, the 
injury to Respondent's lot was substantial and direct 
and Respondent has been subjected to a special burden 
not shared by the public in general. A "taking" is held 
to be present under such circumstances, Hampton, supra, 
21 Utah 2d at 347; See Springville Banking Co. v. Burton, 
supra, 10 Utah 2d at 102-103; See also City of Pueblo 
v. Strait, 20 Colo. 13, 36 P. 789, 792 (1894); Mirmequa 
Lumber Co. v. City and County of Denver, 67 Colo. 472, 
196 P. 539, 540-41 (1919) (both holding that special in-
jury to abutting property is present when access thereto 
fe adversely affected by erection of a highway viaduct.) 
The Assistant Attorney General in the State's brief 
(pages 12-13) concedes the above rule that a taking oc-
curs if an abutter's rights are unreasonably interfered 
with. He argues, however, that, because the large capac-
ity vehicles were forced to cross the center line of the 
highway in entering the subject warehouse property, such 
access would have been denied if the State had erected 
a concrete median divider instead of a viaduct, and the 
Springville Banking case, supra, held the erection of a 
median divider to result only in consequential damage. 
He further argues that some access remained to the prop-
erty by the lane of traffic left by the construction of the 
viaduct which is reasonable for many purposes, and such 
remaining access was held reasonable in Anderson In-
vestment, supra. 
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In the first place, nowhere in the record does it ap-
pear that such vehicles crossed the center line of Fourth 
South in entering the subject warehouse property. As 
was specifically argued to the lower Court (R. 93), Ex-
hibits A and B to Defendant's memorandum (R. 30-35), 
which purport to establish that these vehicles crossed 
the center line in so gaining such access, are unsigned, 
unsworn to, and no indication is given as to who pre-
pared them and what sources they were based upon. 
They, therefore, can serve no purfbse whatsoever in this 
proceeding and the lower Court properly ignored them. 
Respondent's affidavits nowhere indicate that the ve-
hicles crossed the center line to gain access. Paragraph 
6 of Mr. Bailey's affidavit (R. 46), which the State 
claims admits the necessity of such crossing, merely 
states the width of the street to have been "more than 
ample" to enable the vehicles to gain access to the ware-
house door. 
Secondly, even if the trucks did cross the center line, 
the State completely misreads the Springville Banking 
and Anderson cases. In Springville Banking, the con-
struction of a concrete island within the highway over 
its center line by the Commission prevented U turns and 
left turns by traffic across the center of the highway to 
reach plaintiff's business. 10 Utah 2d 101-102. Access 
to that business was held interfered with, but not to an 
unreasonable extent, because any and all traffic that 
needed to reach plaintiffs property was required only 
to follow a more circuitous route rather than follow the 
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shorter one of crossing the center of the highway. This 
Court in this decision, did not, as the Asistant Attorney 
General argues, hold that a highway impediment prevent-
ing the crossing the center line could never so interfere 
with access as to amount to a taking. On the contrary, 
this Court quite properly, on the standard above quoted 
from 3 Nichols, Eminent Domain, §10.221(2), considered 
the injury to plaintiff's property as it was then adapted 
and held inconvenience to plaintiff's customers to be 
consequential damage. Further, this decision is correct 
per Hampton, supra, which holds that, pursuant to its 
police power, the state may, by erecting a highway im-
pediment, divert and regulate the flow of traffic or limit 
access to what is reasonable "under the existing facts 
and circumstances9' as these rights are enjoyed as mem-
bers of the public are not private rights. 21 Utah 2d 347. 
Being forced to follow a more tircuitous route to reach 
property clearly is the deprivation of such a public right 
and has nothing to do with the private right of access. 
Exactly the same conclusion was reached in Anderson, 
supra, where the construction of a viaduct resulted only 
in the necessity that plaintiff and its customers travel 
a more circuitous route to reach plaintiff's property rather 
than cross the center line to do so. 28 Utah 2d 380-381. 
Hampton, supra, states the identical rule as Nichols, 
i.e^ that the right of access is a private right, and, if it 
is unreasonably obstructed in view of the type of prop-
erty involved, damages are recoverable if particular, di-
rect and substantial. 21 Utah 2d at 347. Per above, 
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neither Springuille Banking nor Anderson militate against 
this result. In view of the type of property involved, they 
both hold that access thereto was not unreasonably in-
terfered with as any traffic required to reach such prop-
erty could still do so if it followed a more circuitous route 
rather than the shorter one of crossing the center line. 
That, as pointed out above, is simply not the case on the 
instant facts. No matter what route the trucks followed, 
they could not enter the subject warehouse property as 
a result of the construction of the viaduct. 
This rule of Nichols and Hampton that the reason-
ableness of the interference of access must be determined 
with a view to the type of property involved and the 
purpose to which it is adapted to decide whether the in-
terference amounts to a taking is also dispositive of the 
Assistant Attorney General's Argument that some access 
remains which is reasonable for many purposes. Such 
assertion is true: some access does remain. But land 
abutting on a street is legally entitled to access which 
is reasonable in view of the type of property involved. 
Warehouse properties in general, and Respondent's prop-
erty in particular, must be accessible to vehicles of a 
size enabling the large-volume transfer of goods to and 
from the facility. Such access has, with respect to Re-
spondent's property, been eliminated by the viaduct. 
This rule is also dispositive of the Assistant Attorney 
General's argument that Respondent is attempting to 
ripen a permissive use, that of crossing the center line, 
into a right by adverse possession against the sovereign. 
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Obviously and clearly, the right of access appurtenant 
to Respondent's abutting property was not acquired by 
adverse possession but is an easement or property right 
of a permanent character forming part of the owner's 
estate. Hampton, supra, 21 Utah 2d at 345. In any event, 
the record contains no proper evidence tending to estab-
lish that crossing of the center line was necessary to 
gain access to the warehouse. 
The State lastly claims Moorlane Company v. High-
way Department' 384 S. W. 2d 415 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1964) and Collins v. City of San Antonio, 443 S. W. 2d 
563 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) to be on all fours with and 
dispositive of the issue involved in this appeal. Collins 
is merely another circuity of route case and is distin-
guished above. As to Moorlane, even if this Court per-
mits the decision of an intermediate appellate Texas 
Court to serve as the basis for the law of this state (and 
overrule Hampton, supra) in that case at 418, large 
trucks did not deliver most of the goods to the ware-
house, as they did here, and both large and small trucks 
could still unload at a truck bay, which did not exist here, 
so access was held not unreasonably denied. 
In sum, therefore, viewing Respondent's property 
for the purpose to which it is adapted and which is its 
highest and best use, i.e., a warehouse, the denial of 
access to it by the very vehicles required for the prop-
erty to be so used amounts to a taking of Respondent's 
property by the Commission as a result of the constitu-
tion of the viaduct. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons: (1) the defense of sover-
eign immunity is unavailable to the State as its consent 
to pay compensation in the stipulated amount on the 
resolution of the taking issue against it prior to, in lieu 
of and to prevent Respondent from seeking an injunction 
pending condemnation or agreed compensation is within 
the authority of the Commission; and (2) the destruction 
of access for the very vehicles necessary for the use of 
Respondent property as a warehouse, as it historically 
had been, substantially interferes with the appurtenant 
property right of access thereto and, therefore, amounts 
to or constitutes a taking of such private property by 
the State. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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